Image as Everything ... But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement* by Levinson, Holly
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review
7-1-1997
"Image as Everything"... But Not When It Comes to
a Right of Publicity Infringement*
Holly Levinson
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Entertainment & Sports Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Holly Levinson, "Image as Everything"... But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publicity Infringement*, 14 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev.
83 (1997)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol14/iss1/5
"IMAGE IS EVERYTHING"... BUT NOT
WHEN IT COMES TO A RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY INFRINGEMENT*
HOLLY M. LEVINSON**
.... The arena is packed. Screams and chants blot out the
sound of the ball bouncing on the court. Only seven seconds
left to play in overtime. A bald-headed African-American
player wearing a red, number twenty three jersey has the
ball .... down by one point. He pauses for a moment, chews
his wad of gum a few times, and with a few lightning-quick
moves he fakes out the double team and darts toward the
hoop. As precious seconds tick away he jumps with all his
might and flies endlessly through the air, palming the ball in
his right hand. His mouth is open, his tongue hanging
freely, ready to taste victory at its inception. As the buzzer
sounds he slams the ball down through the net. Vic-
tory .... or is it? Did he beat the buzzer? Twenty thousand
pairs of eyes shift to the referee .... who finally motions that
the basket was good. Champions once again! Time to cele-
brate! But wait .... before our star rejoices with his team, he
darts to the sidelines and grabs .... a six pack of XXX beer.
Just then he turns to the camera, cracks open a can of beer
and says, "now this is what I call the sweet taste of victory."
He wipes the sweat from his brow, takes a huge swig of beer,
and smiles radiantly.
.... The screen fades out .... Now back to live action...'
As the real star, clearly identifiable as Michael Jordan, sits at
home with his family and watches this television commercial,
what is he to think? Certainly, he knows that he never gave per-
mission for his identity to be used in a beer ad. Had he even been
* Tennis ace Andre Agassi made the "image is everything" slogan notorious in
his endorsement of Canon cameras.
** B.A. 1994 Franklin and Marshall College (English and Spanish), magna cum
laude, Phi Beta Kappa, Charles A Dana Scholar; J.D. 1997 Washington and Lee
University School of Law, National Trial Team. The author is a former New Jersey
All-State athlete and a 1993-1994 GTE collegiate Academic All-American Tennis
Player. She is an Assistant District Attorney working for Manhattan D.A. Robert M.
Morgenthau.
1. This hypothetical advertisement is intended to exaggerate the need for courts
to recognize the emotional harm that right of publicity infringements cause.
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approached about doing such an ad, he would have immediately
declined the offer. The name and image of Michael Jordan goes
hand-in-hand with mom and apple pie, not with alcohol and the
like. He is a superstar athlete, a family man, and a nice guy; this
image which Jordan has crafted would undoubtedly be destroyed
by such an alcohol advertisement. Yet, beyond a muddied image
and the resulting economic harm lies the very real emotional
harm Jordan would suffer from the unauthorized use of his image
for an alcohol advertisement. 2 Courts have consistently disre-
garded this emotional harm in right of publicity cases by focusing
exclusively on economic injuries. Consequently, it is this emo-
tional harm which now deserves the spotlight.3
The right of publicity has come a long way since Judge Frank
first coined the term more than forty years ago.4 Defined as "the
right to own, protect, and profit from the commercial value of one's
name, likeness, activities, or identity,"5 the right of publicity has
been invoked to address everything from voice imitations and
celebrity look-alikes to human cannonball acts and caricatures of
nude athletes.6 However, despite the right of publicity's headway,
an ongoing debate remains whether the tort should be classified
as a privacy right or as a property right. This paper suggests that
the tort classification is not of central importance so long as the
remedy is appropriate. To that end, this paper contends that
courts must recognize that celebrities and athletes are not merely
larger than life, money-making icons who turn in their human
qualities when stardom strikes. As such, damages must be
awarded for noneconomic as well as economic harm. Additionally,
punitive damages must be imposed on a regular basis.
2. A right of publicity infringement is only one claim the star would have in the
example provided. While the fact pattern may raise additional issues, this paper
focuses on the right of publicity to the exclusion of other intellectual property rights.
3. This comment will discuss how the unauthorized use of an individual's name,
likeness, or performance for commercial purposes subjects the victim to mental
anguish deserving of compensation. It further argues that the offensiveness of such
an advertisement or product multiplies the victim's emotional injury and should
therefore go to the extent of damages recovered.
4. Haelan Lab., Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
5. Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or
Public Domain? 19 NOVA L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1995).
6. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1513 (1992), (voice imitation) Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1992)., (voice imitation), Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254
afld 488 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (celebrity look-alike); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (human cannonball act) Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (caricature of nude athlete).
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Part I of this paper looks at the right of privacy, the right
from which the right of publicity derives. It also focuses on the
distinctions courts have made between a private plaintiff and a
celebrity plaintiff and explains why privacy law and the celebrity
have been deemed inherently incompatible. Part II examines the
development of the right of publicity and the debate surrounding
its classification as either a property right or a personal right of
privacy. Part III explores the contours of the right of publicity and
what the right protects. Part IV sets forth the justifications for
recognizing the right of publicity and illustrates how the present
status of the tort fails to live up to its justifications. Part V pro-
poses that the right of publicity be seen as a proprietary right
where noneconomic as well as economic concerns are addressed
and where punitive damages are imposed. Finally, Part VI closely
examines Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,' and contends that the case
should serve as a springboard for future publicity cases.
I. THE BIRTH OF A "CLOSE COUSIN":8 THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
In 1890, two young lawyers, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, gave birth to the right of privacy in a landmark
Harvard Law Review article.9 Warren and Brandeis argued that
each individual should be entitled to a "quiet zone" away from the
curious eye or the interested ear.' ° Whether an individual is in
the public life or not, Warren and Brandeis opined that there are
"'[slome things all men alike are entitled to keep from popular
curiosity.""' Just as a physical assault can bruise the skin, an
intrusion into one's "quiet zone" can bruise one's feelings. 12 One
scholar recently added, however, that it is not the intrusion of
one's objective physical space' 3 that causes bruised feelings, but
rather "the transgression of respect owed to individuals in the
7. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
8. Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star, 10
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (1991).
9. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See
also J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY, 1-8.1 [hereinafter
"McCARTHY"].
10. McCARTHY at 1-11, supra note 9, at 1-11.
11. Id. (quoting Warren and Brandeis, supra note 9, at 215-216).
12. Id.
13. Gavison suggests that privacy can be broken down into secrecy, anonymity,
and solitude. She also states that privacy is lost "as others obtain information about
an individual, pay attention to him, or gain access to him." See Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980). See also Robert C. Post,
Rereading Warren & Brandeis: Privacy, Property and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 647, 651 (1991).
19971
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community. '14 However the intrusion may be regarded by legal
scholars, one thing is certain: Warren and Brandeis urged courts
to award damages for emotional harm.
15
Initially, Warren and Brandeis' article was not well received.
In 1902, the Court of Appeals of New York, in Roberson v. Roches-
ter Folding Box Co,16 explicitly rejected the thesis of the "'clever
article' '1 7 and refused to recognize the right of privacy.18 In that
case, the defendant flour mill used a photograph of the plaintiff in
advertisements for its flour without her permission.1 9 The ads
were widely displayed, and the plaintiff claimed she was humili-
ated, suffering nervous shock and serious physical illness as a
result.20 The court, however, refused to grant an injunction and to
award damages. Evidently, Chief Justice Alton B. Parker was
reluctant to part from precedent to adopt the right of privacy, fear-
ing both an entanglement with First Amendment freedoms and
the absurd amount of litigation that he predicted would result.2'
Despite sharing these same concerns, a few years later the
Georgia Supreme Court, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insur-
ance Co., 22 embraced Warren and Brandeis' "novel thesis."23 In
this case, the plaintiff, Pavesich, sued the defendant for its life
insurance advertisement which featured plaintiffs healthy look-
ing photo beside a "disheveled and sickly" man's photo.24 The ad
conveyed a message that unlike the healthy man, the sickly man
had not taken out an insurance policy with New England Life and
now regretted it. 25 Pavesich, "an artist known only by a handful
14. Post, supra note 13, at 647.
15. Legal scholars note that the press' prying into Warren's private life led
Warren and Brandeis to write their landmark article. See McCARTHY, supra note 9,
at 1-14.
16. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
17. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-15 (quoting Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. at 442, 444 (N.Y. 1902)).
18. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
19. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-15.
20. Id.
21. Id. Professor McCarthy remarks in his treatise that Chief Justice Parker's
opinion left the door open for the New York legislature to pass a statute to prevent the
unpermitted use of a name or picture for advertising purposes. Indeed, within a year
following the decision in Roberson, the New York Legislature passed a law (1903 N.Y.
Laws 132) giving a right of action in advertising and trade situations. Id.
22. 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
23. See generally McCARTHY, supra note 9, 1-14 - 1-18. Both Roberson and
Pavesich involved so-called private or non-celebrity plaintiffs whose photographs
were used without permission in advertisements.
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of admirers," claimed that the use of his picture without consent
invaded his privacy by subjecting him to ridicule.26 The court
agreed, at least to the extent that it reinstated Pavesich's invasion
of privacy claim which had been dismissed below for failure to
state a cause of action.17 Accordingly, the court remanded the
case and its invasion of privacy issue to the lower court for a jury
trial.
In a nutshell, Roberson and Pavesich foreshadowed the split
in authority that was to follow regarding the recognition of the
right of privacy.2" In fact, Professor McCarthy indicates29 that it
was not until the 1940s that "the tide had turned in favor of the
right of privacy."3" Moreover, in 1960, William Prosser launched a
curveball when he divided the right of privacy into four distinct
torts: (1) intrusion into seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private
facts; (3) publicity that places someone in a false light; and (4)
misappropriation. 1 The fourth category, misappropriation, is
closely related to the right of publicity.2 While most courts and
legal scholars have regarded misappropriation as a "close
cousin"33 or forerunner of the right of publicity, some have gone so
far as to confuse it with the right of publicity itself.
3 4
The misappropriation tort, by definition, attempts to compen-
sate the victim for the mental anguish inflicted when his identity
is used without permission to promote the sale of commercial
products.35 Since the gravamen of the offense is the damage done
"to [the] individual's self-respect in being made a public spectacle,"
26. Id.
27. In addition to the invasion of privacy claim, the court also upheld a libel
claim. In its view, the false association with defendant insurance company would
make Pavesich out to be a liar and thus "'contemptible' in the eyes of his friends who
knew... that he did not own a New England Life Insurance policy." See McCARTHY,
supra note 9, at 1-17.
28. See generally id. at 1-18.
29. It must be noted that those courts that recognized the right of privacy
uniformly perceived it as a "'personal tort'" where damages were recoverable solely
for "'mental anguish."' See McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-18.
30. Id. at 1-18.
31. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
32. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-24. Roberson and Pavesich both fall into
Prosser's fourth category, misappropriation.
33. Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star, 10
CARDOZO ARTs & ENrT. L.J. 1,6 (1991).
34. See John W. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 833
(6th Cir. 1983). See also Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the
Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782, 791 (1990).
35. McCAnRT, supra note 9, at 1-28. See also Roberson, supra note 16, and
Pavesich, infra note 35.
1997]
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it is said that the tort applies only to the "private" or "relatively
unknown" person.36 The private person is made to suffer the
"double indignity" of (1) "having his name or picture broadcast
throughout the advertising media," and (2) "being forced against
[his] will to help someone sell a product."37 Conceivably, the vic-
tim may suffer a third indignity if he personally finds the product
offensive or distasteful.3" Further, if those who know the victim
find the product offensive, a fourth indignity is likely, as now the
victim has become associated with their perception of the prod-
uct.39 To reiterate, then, it is the public "commercialization of per-
sonality" without consent that causes injury.40 That the public,
the victim, or both find the product detestable adds insult to the
injury.
4 1
It must be noted, however, that a mere showing that the vic-
tim's personality has been commercialized without his consent
does not, in and of itself, state a cause of action for misappropria-
tion. The Louisiana Court of Appeals made this clear in Slocum v.
Sears Roebuck Company,42 in which it ruled that even though the
display of a child's photo as advertisement was technically an
invasion of the child's privacy, the child could not recover since
she suffered no injury. In that case, Sears had taken a photo of a
three and a half month old child in its studio and later displayed
the photo as an advertisement without parental consent.43 The
court pointed to the child's age, her beauty, and the fine quality of
the photo, and concluded that there was hardly a "serious interfer-
36. Id. (citing Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 981 (1964)).
37. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-28. See also Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80 (1905).
("...his liberty has been taken away from him, as long as the advertiser uses him for
these purposes,. . .he is for the time... under the control of another, .... no longer free,
and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a
merciless master... ). Id.
38. It must be noted that the victim's personal distaste for the product may stem
from society's regard for the product. For instance, if the individual's picture is used
to advertise cigarettes, he may find the product offensive based on society's regard for
cigarettes, even though he personally may feel neutrally about the product. In that
regard, it is society's opinion of the product and his association with it that causes
injury. Conversely, he may suffer if he personally finds the product offensive, even
though it is not so perceived by society.
39. The implication is that the victim will be treated differently based on the
unfavorable association with the product.
40. Bloustein, supra note 34, at 987.
41. See Pesce, supra note 32 for a detailed discussion of the "commercialization
of personality" notion.
42. 542 So.2d 777 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
43. The photo was displayed in the studio, on an advertising bulletin board in
the Sears credit department, and at a Sears in another city. Id. at 777.
[Vol. 14:83
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ence with the child's privacy interest," and that the child suffered
no injury." Its ruling hinged on the premise that a child so young
could not have suffered any injury. In sum, Slocum serves as a
reminder that an injury is required for the finding of a tort and
subsequent damages.45
A. Privacy Law and the Celebrity: Inherently Incompatible
Whether the star is a big-name Hollywood actor who fre-
quents the Academy Awards or an athlete who competes each July
on the grass of Wimbledon, he leads his life in the public spotlight
and is considered a celebrity in the eyes of others. No longer can
he walk down the street in broad daylight and go unnoticed.
Whatever means have thrusted him into the public spotlight and
have kept him there, one thing is certain: he has fame, fortune,
and is living a life of stardom-a life where ordinary privacy is
hard to find.
The argument thus follows that privacy law and celebrity sta-
tus are inherently incompatible, particularly when it comes to
claims for misappropriation. A celebrity cannot claim an insult to
his dignity or hurt feelings when his identity is used publicly with-
out permission to sell a product.46 Since a celebrity thrives in the
limelight, the extra time in the spotlight is thought to enhance the
celebrity's notoriety, not cause the mental anguish associated with
an invasion of privacy. Unlike the private citizen, the celebrity
has been conditioned to living a life where people are curiously
seeking information about private matters and where his identity
is exposed for commercial purposes. It is for these reasons that
traditional privacy principles have held that a "celebrity's fame
and public presence constitut[e] a waiver of the celebrity's right to
privacy in his or her picture or name."47 As the following case
illustrates, however, the waiver doctrine may erroneously condone
actions that in fact cause the celebrity emotional harm.
In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,48 the plaintiff was a famous
sports figure who sued Pabst Beer Company for its unauthorized
44. Id. at 779.
45. The court's emphasis on the beauty of the child and the fine quality of the
photos is misplaced and irrelevant. Stated simply, an individual can be injured even
though she is attractive and the pictures taken of her are of fine quality. The deciding
factor in Slocum, which may have been lost in the opinion, was that no injury had
been shown. A better claim would have been that Sears owed the child the reasonable
amount of her picture used in the advertisements (a right of publicity claim).
46. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1.6, at 1-28.
47. Id.
48. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
1997]
7
Levinson: "Image as Everything"... But Not When It Comes to a Right of Publ
Published by Institutional Repository, 1997
90 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
use of his photograph in the company's promotional calendar.4 9
At the time of suit, O'Brien was a two year veteran with the Phila-
delphia Eagles, a professional football team, and had previously
earned a national reputation as a collegiate All-American.5 °
O'Brien argued that the beer company had invaded his privacy by
subjecting him to embarrassment and humiliation. He pointed to
his membership in the Allied Youth of America, a group that dis-
suaded alcohol use among young people, as proof of his public
stance against alcohol. 1 Further, he testified that he had had
many "opportunities to sell his endorsement for beer and alcoholic
beverages but had refused to do so." 52 As a result of defendant's
calendar, O'Brien's face and name had involuntarily become asso-
ciated with publicity for the sale of beer.
Despite O'Brien's effort, the court ruled against him. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding
that O'Brien had no cause of action under traditional privacy the-
ory. 53 The court reasoned that O'Brien was not the "private per-
son" which privacy law intended to protect.54  He was an
outstanding athlete who had "completely publicized" his name
and his pictures, and had therefore "waived his right of privacy."
55
Thus, the court concluded that ".. .the publicity he [O'Brien] got
was only that which he had been constantly seeking and receiv-
ing. 15 However, the court's view was overly broad, since O'Brien
clearly had not been seeking the kind of publicity involved in this
case. In effect, the court declared that O'Brien had traded in his
human qualities upon attaining celebrity status; that is, he had
shed his ability to suffer the indignity caused by the offensive
advertisements.
49. See Steven T. Margolin, From Imitation to Litigation: Expanded Protection
for Commercial Property Rights in Identity, 96 DICK. L. REV. 491, 493 (1992).
50. O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 168. (Defendant had obtained O'Brien's photo from the
University's publicity department).
51. Id. at 168-69.
52. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 170.
54. Id. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-29.
55. Peter L. Fletcher and Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal
of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1586 (1979). Fletcher and Rubin note
that the waiver is not to be taken literally, since a waiver is generally defined as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right of privilege." Rather,
they see a waiver in this context as a "constructive waiver"- merely "a way of
restating the conclusion that public figures have no right of privacy due to the
countervailing and more powerful commands of the First Amendment." Id.
56. O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 170. See also McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-29.
[Vol. 14:83
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B. Celebrities Need A New Tort
As an increasing number of celebrity plaintiffs appeared in
court, it soon became clear that O'Brien was a unique case, in that
celebrities typically did not assert that their feelings had been
hurt by the use of their identity without permission to promote the
sale of commercial products.57 Rather, the main grievance among
celebrities was that they were not compensated for the reasonable
value of their identity-the very identity which the "new strides
in communications, advertising and entertainment" had given
"unfathomed pecuniary value."5 8 Many celebrities pointed out
that they had previously signed contracts and had been paid for
the use of their identity to endorse commercial products. How-
ever, under the present status of the law, celebrities were left
departing courtrooms with wrinkled brows and empty pockets,
disbelieving that they were denied recovery under privacy
theory.59
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IS BORN
In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank's ruling in Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 60 paved the way for a celebrity to
recover the value of his identity when it was used without consent
to promote the sale of commercial products. The controversy
involved two chewing-gum sellers who were competing to obtain
the right to use professional baseball players' pictures on chewing-
gum cards.61 The plaintiff argued that it had made exclusive
agreements with the ballplayers to use their pictures and that
defendant thereafter had "knowingly induced" the ballplayers to
sign contracts with the defendant.62 In addition, the defendant
had also obtained some grants from the ballplayers through an
independent agent and had even used some players' pictures with-
out their consent.63 Although the ballplayers themselves did not
assert any right to compensation for the unauthorized use of their
57. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, 1-35 (discussing Melville B. Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 203, 204 (1954)).
58. Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity
Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782 (1990). See also McCARTHY, supra
note 9, at 1-35 (quoting Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 204 (1954)).
59. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 5.8, 5-68.
60. 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953).
61. Id. at 867.
62. Id. See also McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1.7, 1-32.
63. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1.7, 1-32.
1997]
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identities, the plaintiff argued that it held the exclusive right of
property in the ballplayers' identities as the "exclusive licensee."64
The court approached the problem by dispersing with defend-
ant's argument that the contract with the ballplayers was merely
a waiver of the right to sue for an invasion of privacy.65 In so
doing, the court explicitly rejected Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich &
Bradsby Co.,66 wherein the Fifth Circuit indicated that there was
no such thing as an exclusive license of name and likeness, only a
waiver of privacy.67 Ultimately, the Haelan court held that apart
from the right of privacy, there exists an independent right of pub-
licity in which a "man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph," including the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture.68 Interestingly, Judge Frank avoided say-
ing whether the right of publicity is a property right or a personal
right, essentially deeming the classification inconsequential.69
The door was thus left open for courts and legal scholars to debate
the aforesaid issue among themselves.
Since Haelan, the majority of courts and legal scholars have
perceived the right of publicity as a property right juxtaposed to
the personal right of privacy.70 Whereas invasions of privacy have
been thought to involve "injury to feelings, sensibilities, or reputa-
tion," publicity infringements have been seen as an "appropriation
of rights in the nature of property rights for commercial exploita-
tion."7 1 Under this view, the right of publicity is seen merely as a
tool that grants the individual exclusive control over his iden-
tity.72 As such, the celebrity, in addition to signing endorsement
contracts, is able to assign rights in his identity to others, as was
the case in Haelan. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the property
64. Id. at 1-33.
65. Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
66. 78 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir 1935). The court stated that "[flame is not
merchandise" and that "[i]t would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold
that sale of a famous name to the highest bidder as property." Id.
67. Id. at 767.
68. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-32 (discussing Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum Co., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)).
69. Id. at 1-33.
70. See generally Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the
First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP.
L.J. 171 (1990).
71. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 1-33.
72. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Midler's vocal style was property and that it was misappropriated).
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classification has even enabled a celebrity's heirs to profit from a
celebrity's identity after the celebrity's death.73
In contrast, the minority view perceives the right of publicity
as a privacy right.74 For example, in Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter-
prises, Inc., 5 the court held that the right of privacy allows a per-
son relief when his name has been used without his consent,
either to advertise a product or to enhance the sale of that prod-
uct. In that 1967 case, Arnold Palmer and several other well-
known professional golfers sought an injunction and damages for
privacy invasions resulting from the use of their names as part of
a board game without consent.76 The plaintiffs argued that the
use of their names "reduce[d] their ability to obtain satisfactory
commercial affiliation by licensing agreements," while it increased
the marketability of the board game for the defendant.77
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs' privacy rights
were invaded. First, it noted that all of the golfers may not have
wanted to capitalize upon their names in the commercial field,
apart from the golf course. Second, the court implied that even
if the golfers wanted to commercialize their identity, the golfers
themselves should have been entitled to "enjoy the fruits of [their]
own industry free from unjustified interference."79 In that regard,
defendant's conduct was likened to mere theft, but what was sto-
len clearly went beyond the golfers' identities. In short, the
defendant stole from the plaintiff golfers their power of choice to
control the use of their identities and to decide whether to partake
in defendant's commercial endeavor. As it turned out, the golfers
were forced into endorsing a product which they had not chosen to
endorse.
73. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
74. See also Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings, 501 F.2d
1082 (1974). Carson sued for the unauthorized use of his name in an advertisement
for one of defendant's subsidiary companies. Carson's complaint did not allege a
privacy invasion, yet the court applied pure privacy standards and denied relief to
Carson for his failure to show mental anguish. See also J. Joseph Bodine, Jr., A
Picture is Worth $775.00: The Right of Publicity, An Analysis and Proposed Test, 17
CAP. U. L. REV. 411, 416 (1988).
75. 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
76. Id. at 459.
77. Id.
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
What exactly the right of publicity protects, how far it
extends, and who holds a right of publicity are the three issues
most heavily debated behind the privacy/property debate previ-
ously mentioned. Generally speaking, the right of publicity is
defined as "the right to own, protect, and profit from the commer-
cial value of one's name, likeness, activities, or identity." 0 Every
person has a right to control and profit from the value of his iden-
tity or performance, although the right of publicity claims are
most readily identifiable with celebrities or athletes.8 1 Moreover,
in terms of defining the outer limits of one's identity which the
right protects, case law indicates that the extent to which courts
are willing to characterize something as one's identity varies
among the nation's jurisdictions. The present trend among courts,
however, is to view one's identity broadly and thus accord the
celebrity a great deal of protection from commercial exploitation. 2
A. Protection for Items Associated with a Celebrity
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Mot-
schenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, expanded protec-
tion of a celebrity's identity beyond his "name or likeness."8 3 In
that case, the plaintiff, Motschenbacher, was a professional race
car driver who derived part of his income from commercial
endorsements."4 The plaintiffs personal "trademark" was his car,
which he "individualized" to set it apart from those of other driv-
ers and to make it "more readily identifiable" as his own.8 5 The
plaintiff sued defendant tobacco company for its television com-
mercial, which depicted plaintiffs car in the foreground on a race-
track and which conveyed a message that the plaintiffs car was
sponsored by Winston Cigarettes.8 6 In addition to the images
80. Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or
Public Domain?, 19 NovA L. REV. 1013 (1995). (quoting Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
81. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 4.3, 4-19.
82. See also White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.
1993). It should be noted that many states have created their own right of publicity/
privacy statutes. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989).
83. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). Initially, the right of publicity was limited to
protection of one's name and likeness. Id. at 824.
84. Id. at 822.
85. SHELDON S. HALPERN, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, AND
MORAL RIGHTS 494 (2d. ed 1993) (citing Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 821).
86. The court noted that the driver of the car, which bore resemblance to
plaintiffs distinctive car, was unrecognizable. See HALPERN, supra note 85, at 494.
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from the racetrack, the ad contained written messages as to the
"good taste" of Winston cigarettes.
Motschenbacher alleged that he was due a reasonable amount
for the unauthorized use of his identity (a right of publicity claim).
Interestingly, he did not allege that the association with cigarettes
injured his feelings or insulted his dignity (a right of privacy
claim).8" One logical inference from Motschenbacher's pleading
was that he was purely concerned with his not having been paid to
endorse the product. In making its ruling, the court first noted
that Motschenbacher was identifiable in the commercial, since the
car used in the commercial caused people to think that it was Mot-
schenbacher's car and to infer that the driver was in fact Mot-
schenbacher8 9 In the court's view, it was enough that the car,
though altered slightly, evoked the plaintiffs identity. Thereafter,
the court ruled that Motschenbacher was owed the reasonable
value for the unauthorized use of his identity.
B. Protection for Performances
In 1977 the Supreme Court, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., addressed First Amendment issues pertaining
to the right of publicity.90 In Zacchini, the petitioner was an
entertainer whose entire performance, a human cannonball act
lasting fifteen seconds, was shown on a newsclip without his con-
sent.9 The defendant argued that its broadcast of the perform-
ance was protected by the First Amendment as newsworthy
information.92 The Court disagreed, noting that the broadcast of
the entire act posed a "substantial threat to the economic value of
that performance" and thus went beyond the newsworthy excep-
87. Id.
88. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824. The court made the distinction
emphasized earlier in this paper: an injury suffered from an appropriation of one's
identity may be "mental and subjective" in the nature of humiliation and
embarrassment (and thus amount to an invasion of privacy). However, where the
identity appropriated has a commercial value, the injury may be economic in nature.
After making this distinction, however, the court refused to say whether the
protection of plaintiffs identity would fall "under the rubric of 'privacy,' 'property', or
'publicity.' Instead, the court stated that it only needed to determine whether
California would recognize one's interest in identity and protect it. Id.
89. Id. at 827.
90. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
91. Id. at 564. The Supreme Court highlighted the fact that petitioner asked
respondent not to film the performance. However, the next day, respondent returned,
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tion protected by the First Amendment.93 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court that the economic value of
the act emanated from the "right of exclusive control over the pub-
licity given to his performance."94 Consequently, the broadcast
violated petitioner's right of publicity because the broadcast "was
similar to preventing petitioner from charging an admission
fee."95
C. Protection for Celebrity Caricatures Based on Picture,
Context, and Slogan9 6
In 1978, in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,97 boxing champ Muhammad
Ali sued Playgirl Magazine for its depiction of a nude black man
seated in a corner of a boxing ring underneath captions that read:
"Mystery Man" and "The Greatest."9 Ali sought a preliminary
injunction and damages for a common law right of publicity
infringement as well as for a violation of New York's privacy
law. 99 He did not claim injury to his feelings or insult to his dig-
nity, but rather, damage to his public reputation and the economic
consequences thereof. 00 He premised his argument on the fact
that he had spent a great deal of time and effort throughout his
career establishing a commercially valuable proprietary interest
in his likeness and reputation. °'
In granting a preliminary injunction, the court ruled that
plaintiff had established probable success for his claim that the
93. Id. at 562. Moreover, the Court later emphasized that petitioner's human
cannonball act was the "product of petitioner's talents and energy, the end result of
much time, effort, and expense." Id. at 575.
94. Id. at 576. Given the free public broadcast, there was less of an incentive for
the public to pay money to go see the performance live.
95. That the entire performance was appropriated seems significant and leaves
open the possibility that the First Amendment would have protected anything less
than the appropriation of the entire performance. The Court in Zacchini stated that
"neither the public nor the performer will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's
[entire] performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately
recognized." Id. at 578.
96. McCARTHy, supra note 9, at § 4.9, 4-49.
97. 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. Id. at 726. It must further be noted that the phrase "The Greatest" had for a
long time been associated with Ali. As the caricature also resembled Ali, the Court
found no real difficulty in concluding that Ali's identity was in fact depicted in the
magazine. Id. at 726-27. See also McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 4-62.
99. Ali sued under New York's right of privacy statute which prohibits the
unauthorized use of an individual's portrait or picture for trade purposes. N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS § 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989).
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defendant had violated New York's privacy statute and infringed
upon Ali's common law right of publicity. 10 2 It found that the
defendant appeared not only "to be usurping plaintiffs valuable
right of publicity for [itself to sell magazines,] but fit also] may
well be inflicting damage upon [h]is marketable reputation."
10 3
The Court pointed to the fact that the caricature was a full frontal
nude drawing and not simply a sketch of Ali as he appears in the
public eye.104 Hence, even though Ali did not argue that he was
insulted or horrified by the nature of the sketch, the court implied
that his fans and the readers of Playgirl Magazine may have been
offended, thus harming Ali's reputation. The uninformed reader
may have perceived Ali in a negative light for having posed for
such an offensive sketch, or for having allowed Playgirl Magazine
to depict him in that manner.
D. Protection for Nicknames
In 1979 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Hirsch v. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc., ° agreed to extend protection of a celebrity's
identity to include a nickname which had been appropriated with-
out the celebrity's permission to sell a commercial product. The
case involved Elroy Hirsch, a sports figure who had achieved
"national prominence" from his remarkable athletic career, as well
as a notorious nickname, "Crazylegs," from his unique running
style.'1 6 At trial, Hirsch added that he had received honors for his
outstanding character trait in addition to his athletic achieve-
ments, and had thus become very "protective of his name and
what type of product it was connected with.' 10 7 Hirsch sued a
lady's shaving gel manufacturer for the unauthorized use of his
nickname on its product. To value the aforesaid use, Hirsch pro-
duced two witnesses at trial who were experts in the field of prod-
uct endorsements.' 0 8
102. Id. It should be noted that at the time Ali was decided, New York
recognized a common law right of publicity.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 280 N.W. 2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
106. Id. at 131. Hirsch was the first athlete to earn four varsity letters in one
year at the University of Michigan. Thereafter, Hirsch played professional football
and professional basketball and won numerous awards. He was nicknamed
"Crazylegs" for his unique running style. Id.
107. Id. at 132. Hirsch had done advertisements in the past in which he had
been identified only as "Crazylegs." He also noted that he refused to do cigarette ads
and, once he had been hired to coach college football, he refused to do alcohol ads as
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In ruling on defendant's motion for a demurrer, the court con-
cluded that Hirsch had a valid cause of action as a matter of law
under the common law right of publicity. 109 It emphasized that
Hirsch had appeared in a number of commercials identified only
by his nickname." 0 Moreover, on remand, the court stated that
Hirsch might present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could
find that the nickname identified him and that the use of that
name had a commercial value to the defendant."' Accordingly,
the court remanded the case in order for Hirsch to prove that (1)
the name, "Crazylegs," in fact identifie[d] him, and that (2) he
"ha[d] suffered damages based either on his loss or on Johnson's
unjust enrichment."1
12
E. Protection for Phrases Associated with a Celebrity
In 1982, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
Johnny Carson, the famous host of the Tonight Show, sued a cor-
poration that rented and sold "Here's Johnny" portable toilets,
alleging a right of publicity infringement." 3 While the phrase
"Here's Johnny" was neither Carson's actual name nor his nick-
name, he claimed that the aforesaid phrase of nightly introduction
had become intertwined with his identity and was entitled to pro-
tection." 4 The court found support for Carson's argument from
Dean Prosser, who noted that "a stage or other fictitious name can
be so identified with the plaintiff so that he is entitled to protec-
tion against its use.""' The court pointed to the fact that the
defendant knew that the phrase "Here's Johnny" evoked Johnny
Carson's image and that it purposely linked the phrase to its cor-
porate name and product to grab public attention. 1 6 Conse-
quently, the court ruled in favor of Carson, characterizing the
defendant's conduct as similar to theft.
109. The court added that Hirsch also would have had a cause of action under a
Wisconsin statute, but it had been enacted after Johnson's "Crazylegs" product was
taken off the market. Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (2)(b) (1977).
110. Id.
111. Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 140. See also Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295
F.Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(protecting the pen name Dr. Seuss).
112. Id.
113. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
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F. Protection for Celebrities "Inextricably Identified""7 as a
Film Character
Within the Third Circuit, 1994 marked another breakthrough
in publicity protection rights for celebrities. In McFarland v.
Miller," the so-called Spanky McFarland case, George McFar-
land's widow continued a lawsuit that began during the actor's
lifetime against the Spanky McFarland restaurant. For eleven
years during his childhood, McFarland was a leading child actor
nicknamed "Spanky" in the popular "Our Gang" movie and televi-
sion series.' 1 9 As it turned out, "Spanky" was McFarland's actual
nickname. The nickname was initially picked up by the film pro-
ducer, and later used in the television series. It was his nick-
name, McFarland argued, which the defendant was using without
McFarland's consent to promote defendant's restaurant.
In ruling on the plaintiffs right of publicity claim, the Third
Circuit determined that a triable issue of fact existed as to
whether McFarland's character had become "so closely identified
with him that it [had] becom[e] inseparable from the actor's own
public image."120 The court held that if McFarland had indeed
become so "inextricably identified" with the character "Spanky,"
then he would have a right of publicity in the "Spanky" charac-
ter. 1 2 1 However, the court did not have to decide whether McFar-
land and the character he portrayed were but one character. The
court was merely deciding if plaintiff could go forward to try to
prove to a jury that McFarland had a right to control and profit
from the use of the "Spanky" nickname. Thereafter, a jury would
have to decide if the defendant in fact infringed on plaintiffs right
of publicity.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The primary justification for recognizing the right of publicity
is based upon the maxim that people should not take what does
not belong to them. Given the vast amount of time and effort a
celebrity devotes to crafting an image, it follows that the celebrity
117. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 4.13 [D], 4-79.
118. 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 914.
120. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at 4-80 (discussing McFarland, 14 F.3d at 921).
121. If McFarland were to be inextricably identifiable as "Spanky" from "Our
Gang," another issue that would need to be examined is whether McFarland had
contractually transferred or licensed another party who would be the only one
entitled to sue this defendant for a right of publicity infringement. See McCARTHY,
supra note 9, § 4.13 [DL, 4-80.
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is entitled to profit from such devotion.'2 2 As such, the right of
publicity tort is intended to safeguard the celebrity's identity, and
prevent the wrongdoer from being unjustly enriched. In further-
ance of this goal, courts typically have awarded compensatory
damages for a right of publicity infringement.
12 3
A. The Shortcomings of the Unjust Enrichment Rationale
Awarding compensatory damages for a right of publicity
infringement undermines the 'unjust enrichment' rationale.
Despite the fact that the wrongdoer is required to pay compensa-
tory damages, the wrongdoer is nevertheless unjustly enriched by
the mere fact that he or she has forced the celebrity into a con-
tract. Simply stated, the wrongdoer has intentionally thrusted
the celebrity into promoting a product which the celebrity did not
choose to endorse. Hence, although the celebrity is eventually
compensated for the unauthorized use of his identity, the wrong-
doer is nevertheless unjustly enriched. Such enrichment is gained
via increased notoriety and sales resulting from the forced
endorsement.124 Thus, the celebrity is left with compensatory
damages, while the wrongdoer retains the difference between the
increased sales and the aforesaid damages combined with attor-
ney fees. As such, the decision to infringe on a celebrity's right of
publicity amounts to a mere utilitarian calculus.'
25
122. Vicki Gerl Neumeyer, The Right of Publicity and its Descendibility, 7 U.
MIAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 287 (1990), (quoting Harvard Law Review Association,
Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the
Right to Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1703, n. 14 at 1705 (1983)). Some courts and
legal scholars have analogized the right of publicity to a "commercial entity's right to
profit from the 'goodwill' it has built up in its name." Id.
123. These damages were based upon the amount the celebrity would have
received had he authorized the use of his identity for the project at issue.
124. Moreover, the wrongdoer is unjustly enriched by ignoring the celebrity's
power to choose whether to participate in the project. The fact that the celebrity is
awarded compensatory damages does not make up for the fact that he had no say in
the matter, or if he did, that his position was ignored.
125. The utilitarian calculus is the weighing of options and choosing the option
that brings the most happiness, insofar as that happiness outweighs the unhappiness
that results from the aforesaid choice. In the right of publicity context, then, a
defendant merely has to predict the worth of a celebrity's identity and balance that
value against projected sales increases resulting from the infringement. Thus, a
defendant will knowingly infringe if projected sales outweigh the legal costs. In
Onassis v. Christian Dior, the court ruled that the advertisement containing a
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis look-alike, having been already published, was not
subject to recall. While plaintiff was thus assured against any future publication with
the granting of a preliminary injunction, the defendant was left with the skyrocketing
sales resulting from the advertisement. 472 N.Y.S. 2d 254, 263 (N.Y. 1984).
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Moreover, the unjust enrichment rationale simply does not
hold up when the forced endorsement results after the celebrity
expressly refuses to sign a contract. In such a scenario, the
defendant has not foregone asking the celebrity for permission to
use his identity; rather, the defendant has made the effort but was
turned down. Consequently, a defendant who ignores the celeb-
rity's wishes is unjustly enriched because nothing can blot out the
celebrity's express refusal to serve as a badge of approval for the
commercial product.126 The following case highlights the short-
comings of the unjust enrichment rationale where the plaintiff has
expressly refused to sign a contract.
In 1977, in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane, & Bernach, Inc., Guy
Lombardo, the famous band leader, sued an advertiser who
wanted Lombardo to appear in a commercial for a new car
model. 12 7 Initially, defendant began to negotiate a contract with
Lombardo, but when the terms did not satisfy Lombardo, he
refused to appear in the commercial. 2 ' Nevertheless, defendant
shot the commercial anyway, using an actor who perfectly imi-
tated Lombardo's infamous gestures and musical style, as well as
Lombardo's theme song, "Auld Lang Syne." 29 Lombardo sued for
damages for a right of publicity infringement as well as for a viola-
tion of New York's privacy statute. Although he prevailed on his
publicity claim, with the court factoring in the defendant's clear
intention to infringe, the court only awarded Lombardo compensa-
tory damages.130 The fact that the defendant used Lombardo's
identity after Lombardo had expressly denied permission to do so
was but a slap in the face to Lombardo, an added insult to the
injury inflicted.
B. The Right of Publicity Is Not "The" Driving Force
Behind An Athlete's Or Celebrity's Performance
A second justification frequently cited for recognizing the
right of publicity tort is to encourage creative endeavors and per-
126. Id.
127. 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). The defendant was interested in
portraying a New Year's Eve theme in the commercial - a theme for which Lombardo
had become famous. Id. at 664.
128. Id. at 665.
129. Id. See also Margolin, supra note 49, at 500. Margolin notes that
Lombardo was known for his specific directing technique and the resulting musical
style he evoked from his band.
130. The defendant's clear intention to infringe also played a role in deciding the
main issue in the case - whether the right of publicity should protect the style and
mannerisms associated with Lombardo. See Margolin, supra note 49, at 501.
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formances. This justification, however, also falls short. The
threat of an injunction and/or the imposition of compensatory
damages can only go so far to encourage entertainers to perform
and athletes to compete. In reality, it is difficult to imagine that
Michael Jordan is motivated to play for the Chicago Bulls solely
because he knows that his right of publicity is protected and he
will receive compensatory damages if it is infringed. The focus of
this rationale is misplaced, for the focus should be on the advertis-
ers and producers of the commercial products. The right of public-
ity should serve as reassurance to the celebrity or athlete that the
law recognizes the value of his/her identity by warning potential
infringers that the consequences of a publicity infringement are
more serious than they otherwise had thought. Only by increas-
ing the stake of the infringement-punishment-will the creative
endeavor rationale stand its ground and serve its purpose.131
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS A PROPRIETARY INTEREST
A. Image Is Everything to the Athlete or Celebrity
The first step in revamping the right of publicity tort is to
identify the interests the tort must protect to conform to moderni-
zation in the late 1990s. To do so, one must recognize the extent
to which advances in technology, advertisements, and even sci-
ence have affected the sports and entertainment world. These
advances have brought to the forefront the clich6 made famous by
tennis ace, Andre Agassi, that "image is everything" to the athlete
or celebrity. 132 In today's world, athletes and celebrities have
agents, managers, coaches, and private trainers to guide them in
crafting an image they want to convey to society.1 33 For instance,
whereas Andre Agassi has crafted a rock n' roll rebel image with
his flashy clothes, gaudy sneakers, and infamous hairdos, 34
Michael Jordan has crafted an image of a superstar athlete who is
a family man and a nice guy. Dennis "The Worm" Rodman has
131. To take the theft analogy even further, consider what happens when a thief
is caught with stolen goods. Not only are the goods returned to the proper owner, but
the thief is also punished for his conduct - namely, by the imposition of a jail
sentence or a heavy fine. Hence, punishment must be imposed on right of publicity
infringers, which in turn, will deter similar conduct in the future.
132. See supra note 2.
133. Part of constructing that image involves making conscious choices as to the
commercial endorsements in which one will partake.
134. Agassi has also maintained a respectable image as a world-class athlete
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also come into the limelight and capitalized on his bad boy image.
These are just a few examples underscoring the fact that crafting
an image is a deliberate and calculated process.135
B. Crafting An Image: Modern-Day Considerations
One modern-day consideration bearing on one's image is the
fitness craze and its effect on athletes foremost, and also on celeb-
rities. In recent years, the world has come to know the extent to
which athletes devote themselves to intense cross-training and
weight-lifting exercises outside of their usual on court/on field
training. Besides the obvious advantage physical fitness has
when the athlete is competing in his respective sport, the appear-
ance of being fit can also have a positive impact on the athlete's
image as a dedicated and hardworking professional worthy of
commercial endorsements. Pete Sampras and Chris Evert are two
such athletes, both having trained diligently off the court to
improve their tennis games, and in the process, they have also
reaped the benefits in lucrative commercial endorsements. 136 In
the entertainment world, the fitness craze clearly has affected
actresses such as Demi Moore, who bears everything in front of
the camera for millions. Moore lives and dies by her sculpted body
because that is the image she has crafted and has worked dili-
gently to maintain.
Along with the fitness craze of the 1990s, one must consider
the effect that drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes have on the way in
which the celebrity crafts and maintains his image. With the
advances in science over the past few decades, it has become clear
that cigarettes are harmful, cancer-causing toxins. In today's
world, an athlete or celebrity therefore may choose to steer clear of
an affiliation with cigarettes based on the harsh effect it would
have on his image. The situation of "Crazylegs" Elroy Hirsch
exemplifies this point. 37 Hirsch refused to do cigarette advertise-
ments because the association would not suit the image Hirsch
had crafted of himself as a star athlete who had won honors for his
upstanding character.
135. Madonna serves as a good example in the entertainment world. She has
crafted an image of a rebellious and ffirtatious woman who shocks the conscience but
appears not to care what the public thinks of her.
136. The volleyball star Gabrielle Reece also serves as a good example here. In
addition to her athletic career, she has taken up modeling. Thus, her athletic training
thus has bolstered her career as a model, depicting a strong yet beautiful woman.
137. See supra note 104.
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Alcohol has taken on a similar stigma in the eyes of many
professional athletes, a stigma which ultimately could destroy an
athlete's image. The O'Brien case discussed earlier serves as a
glowing example. 138 At trial, O'Brien emphasized the fact that he
was very protective of his image and had made conscious choices
to preserve his image as a football star fully devoted to his career.
To that end, O'Brien had refused endorsement contracts for alco-
hol advertisements and had even joined a group aimed at dissuad-
ing youths from using alcohol. 139 Hence, his association with
alcohol had a detrimental effect on his image, especially since only
he and those who knew him were aware that the association was
in fact involuntary. The introductory commercial with the
Michael Jordan look-alike is intended to illustrate just how harm-
ful a muddied image can be to an athlete's image, to future mar-
ketability, and to his feelings4 °
C. A Right of Publicity Infringement Harms More than
One's Image
In light of the crucial role an image plays to the athlete or
celebrity in the 1990s, courts must realize that the harm caused
by a right of publicity infringement goes beyond the economic
harm resulting therefrom. Celebrities and athletes are not merely
larger than life, money-making icons who turn in their human
qualities when stardom strikes. To the contrary, they are human
beings whose images have become so intertwined with their feel-
ings and their efforts to preserve their images that the images
themselves have become part of their personalities. As such, one
can logically conclude that a celebrity's feelings in fact are hurt by
the unauthorized use of his image for commercial purposes. That
the celebrity may also find the product offensive and/or has
expressly refused to promote the product merely adds insult to the
injury already inflicted.
1 41
Given the vast amount of time and effort a celebrity devotes to
crafting and maintaining an image, it is only natural for a celeb-
rity to feel violated and outraged when his image is used without
permission to sell commercial products. In actuality, the celebrity
has been victimized; he has been robbed, cheated, and perhaps
138. See supra note 48.
139. See O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 169.
140. The reality is that Jordan's perfect image, besides his superb athletic
abilities, bring him many million dollar endorsement contracts.
141. See supra note 3.
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deceived in the process. The fact that the thief is later forced to
turn over the stolen goods via compensatory damages does not
account for the feeling of loss and anger which the victim is made
to suffer. The reason is that the celebrity's "sphere of decision-
making"142 has been intruded upon and his image and sense of
control may never be the same again. As such, court-imposed
compensatory damages become merely the fruits of a contract into
which the victim was essentially forced.
Further, the emotional harm discussed above may indeed be
worsened for reasons which were touched upon in Palmer-
namely, that the celebrity or athlete may not want to commercial-
ize his identity at all. One case which highlights this view is
Onassis v. Christian Dior,143 wherein Jacqueline Kennedy Onas-
sis sued Dior for its commercial advertisement containing a pic-
ture of a "look-alike" model.'4 In that case, Dior did not even
bother to approach Onassis to solicit an endorsement contract
because it "knew that there was little or no likelihood that Mrs.
Onassis would ever consent to be depicted in this kind of advertis-
ing campaign for Dior."145 Mrs. Onassis had publicized the fact
that she had never allowed her name or picture to be used in con-
nection with the promotion of commercial products.
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis was a public figure devoted to
non-commercial endeavors. She had a carefully crafted image and
only allowed her identity to be used "in connection with certain
public services, civic, art and educational projects which she had
supported." When all was said and done, however, Dior forced her
into a spotlight to which she was clearly opposed, one that ulti-
mately left Dior with sales that "went through the roof."146 To say
that Mrs. Onassis was not left emotionally harmed by Dior's act is
absurd. The argument that Onassis' purpose in suing Dior was to
be compensated for the reasonable value of her identity, an iden-
142. Alisa M. Weisman, Note, Publicity as an Aspect of Privacy and Personal
Autonomy, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 727, 730 (1982). Weisman notes that "the insult that is
caused by unauthorized publicity use is not the unauthorized communication itself,
but the fact that the victim was not consulted regarding the use of his personality."
Id. at 728-29.
143. 472 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
144. Onassis sued for violation of New York's privacy statute (N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS.
§ 50, 51) and for a common law right of publicity infringement. She was unable to
recover under New York's privacy statute which limits recovery to a "portrait or
picture."
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tity which she had never before even attempted to sell, is equally
as ludicrous.
In addition to public figures like Mrs. Onassis, one must con-
sider the emotional harm commercial exploitation might inflict on
the politician or on other public officials whose motivations for
being in the public eye are non-monetary. Consider someone like
Martin Luther King, Jr., who stepped into the limelight as a
leader of the civil rights movement. His purpose was not to sell
his image and to make money therefrom, but to promote equality
and to reap the benefits of living in a society where everyone is
equal. Since his motivations were non-monetary in the first place,
King might have been emotionally damaged if his image were
used during his lifetime without his consent to help sell a prod-
uct. 147 A commercial appearance, one made voluntary or involun-
tary, arguably would have detracted from the message Martin
Luther King, Jr. sought to convey to the public. Worse yet, per-
haps commercial appearances would have led the public to ques-
tion his motivations and his character, thus robbing him of respect
and support.
148
D. Publicity As an "Aspect of Personal Autonomy"
149
To bring the right of publicity tort up to date with life in the
1990s first requires a change in the way courts view the interests
which the right protects. As discussed above, "image is every-
thing" to a celebrity or athlete, but the harm caused by a right of
publicity infringement is not limited to pecuniary injuries stem-
ming from a tarnished image. 150 Beyond a muddied image lies the
147. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983). King's estate sued for the
value of King's image depicted in plastic busts which were sold for profit. The main
issues were the descendibility of the right of publicity and whether King's image had
to be exploited during his life (which had not) for his estate to be compensated for the
right of publicity infringement. There was no claim that his family's feelings were
injured by the use of the deceased's image for commercial purposes without their
consent. Even if there were such a claim, that would be a separate issue, since the
claim of injured feelings would have been made by the family and not by King, who
had died. In any event, my purpose here is to argue that if King's image were used for
commercial purposes while he was alive and without his consent, it is reasonable to
conclude that his feelings in fact would have been injured - especially in light of his
non-monetary interests in being in the public spotlight. Id. at 676-80.
148. The fact that a commercial appearance would have been involuntary would
not matter since the public would not know that he was forced into it. It is the
public's perception of the appearance that is crucial.
149. See Weisman, supra note 142, at 727.
150. See supra note 2.
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very real emotional harm a celebrity suffers when his image is
used without permission to sell a product. In that regard, Alicia
Weisman is directly on point when she likens the unauthorized
publicity to "an invasion.. .that intrudes on the individual, impos-
ing on him the decisions of others regarding the use of his person-
ality."15 ' In fact, it is this very "intrusion into the individual's
sphere of decision-making" that causes the emotional harm tradi-
tionally associated with privacy law.
152
Beyond the emotional harm that stems from the mere fact of
the intrusion lies the additional indignities caused by the offen-
sive nature of the advertisements or the product itself. Undoubt-
edly, a celebrity or athlete will suffer greater emotional trauma by
a forced association with alcohol, cigarettes, or some other product
which he finds repulsive. Hence, the offensive nature of the prod-
uct should go to the extent of the emotional injury, which in turn,
should affect the computation of damages awarded to the plaintiff.
In determining the offensiveness of the product, courts should not
only consider the plaintiffs subjective view, but they should also
take a step back to look at the plaintiffs image and consider the
choices he has made throughout his career to craft and maintain
that image. Thereafter, the court should make a determination as
to the reasonable extent of emotional and pecuniary damages the
plaintiff suffered.
E. The Role of Punitive Damages in Right of
Publicity Cases
Another factor to consider in shaping the tort to fit the pres-
ent is the role punitive damages should play in right of publicity
cases. When it comes to right of publicity cases, the issue of puni-
tive damages has typically been skirted by courts and attorneys
alike. Punitive damages in other areas of the law are imposed in
cases where there is clear and convincing evidence of wanton,
gross, malicious, or reckless conduct on the part of the defend-
ant.' 53 Moreover, where acts are willfully committed in reckless
disregard of another's rights, most courts have held that malice
may be inferred and punitive damages imposed thereafter.15 4
Given the deterrent effect of punitive damages, their imposition is
the springboard needed to make the publicity tort fit its justifica-
151. Weisman, supra note 142, at 730.
152. Id.
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tions and conform to life in the late 1990s. The fact that there is
no cap on punitive damages, at least in theory, will in addition
remove the utilitarian calculus aspect from a publicity
infringement. 155
VI. WAirs v. FRITo-LAY, INC.."156 A SPRINGBOARD FOR
THE FUTURE
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a
remarkable decision which should serve as a guide for future right
of publicity cases nationwide. The case involved singer Tom Waits
who sued Frito-Lay, Inc. for its unauthorized imitation of his
unique voice in its radio commercials advertising its products.
Waits sought damages for economic and noneconomic harm, argu-
ing that the commercials damaged his artistic reputation. In
making its ruling, not only did the court confirm that California
law protects a singer's unique voice as part of his identity, but it
also imposed a $2 million punitive damages award to accompany
the $375,000 it awarded to compensate Waits for economic and
noneconomic harm. 157 In so doing, the court sent a strong
message to deter advertisers and others who may consider infring-
ing on a celebrity's right of publicity in the future.5 "
The first issue the court decided on Waits' publicity claim was
whether his voice had become part of his identity and was there-
fore protected by his right of publicity. As precedent, the court
examined Midler v. Ford Motor Co, another Ninth Circuit case,
where the court ruled that a voice can indeed become part of a
professional singer's identity when it is distinctive in nature and
the singer is widely known. 159 Using Midler as a guide, the court
confirmed that Waits' raspy voice was distinctive and that it in
fact identified Waits. 160 Further, the court upheld the trial court's
finding that Waits was a widely known singer. Thereafter, the
court concluded that because Waits' voice was deliberately imi-
tated in order to sell a product, and because Waits was subse-
155. At present, the only cap on punitive damages is the standard for
determining if the punitive damages imposed are excessive. The aforesaid standard
is whether the amount imposed shocks the conscious of the judiciary.
156. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
157. Id.
158. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106. The Waits case also involved a claim under the
Lanham Act.
159. 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
160. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098-99.
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quently injured, a tort was committed.16 ' As such, California's
broad protection for the celebrity was once again confirmed.
To gauge the extent of Waits' injuries, the court highlighted
the following: (1) for at least ten years prior to the lawsuit, Tom
Waits had maintained a strong policy against doing commercials
and had rejected numerous lucrative offers to endorse major prod-
ucts; (2) Waits had made it known to the public in numerous mag-
azine, radio, and newspaper interviews that he thought "musical
artists should not do commercials because it detracts from their
artistic integrity;" (3) the executive producer of the Frito-Lay's
advertising campaign at issue had previously approached Waits to
do a commercial and admitted that he had never "heard anybody
say no so fast" as Tom Waits; (4) the ad's producer expressed his
concern about possible legal ramifications of the voice imitation,
after hearing it at rehearsal because it sounded almost identical to
Waits' voice. 1'62
In addition to the above findings, the court focused on Waits'
reaction to the commercial once it was aired over the radio. It
noted that: (1) Waits had heard it during an appearance on a Los
Angeles radio program and was immediately shocked, angry, and
embarrassed; (2) Waits knew at that point that whoever heard the
commercial would presume that Tom Waits had agreed to do a
commercial for Doritos, against his well-known policy against
doing commercial advertisements; and that (3) Waits' feelings
"grew and grew" over a few days because of the humiliation that
resulted from making him an apparent hypocrite. 163 Based on all
of these facts, the court ruled that Waits' artistic reputation had
been damaged. It determined that his public opposition to com-
mercials had become part of his character, personality, and artis-
tic image.1
6 4
The court's examination of Waits' injuries and its approach to
damages interpreted a law that had already been kind to celebri-
ties even more generous. Since Waits was clearly opposed to
doing commercials and had made his view known, the court
agreed with the trial court that he may recover damages for the
161. Id. at 1098.
162. Id. at 1097-98.
163. Id. at 1103.
164. Id at 1104. Waits produced experts to value the harm done as well as the
harmful effects on the future publicity value of Waits' image. Based on the testimony
of Waits' expert witnesses, the appellate court agreed that a jury could have inferred
that "if Waits ever wanted to do a commercial in the future, the fee he could command
would be lowered by $50,000 to $150,000 because of the Doritos commercial." Id.
19971
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"'shame, humiliation, embarrassment [and] anger"' he suffered. 165
Moreover, the court allowed the imposition of two million dollars
in punitive damages based on the fact that Waits proved by "clear
and convincing evidence" that the defendant had been "guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice."' 66 The defendant knew that Waits
was strongly opposed to doing commercials because of his many
public interviews and the very fact that he had previously rejected
an offer from the same agency to do a commercial. Hence, by
ignoring Waits' wishes and going ahead with the commercial, the
court ruled that the defendant acted with "willful and conscious
disregard" of Waits' rights.'67
From a legal stance, the imposition of punitive damages was
appropriate and its implications are far-reaching. First, the
court's action made Frito-Lay learn a lesson the hard way-
namely, that social conventions, "such as obtaining permission for
publicizing a person's identity or respecting that person's refusal
to permit such use" exist within the advertising world and must
be respected. 168 Second, the imposition of punitive damages sur-
prised Frito-Lay, who had earlier expressed its concern over possi-
ble legal action if it used the sound-alike, but presumably never
imagined that punitive damages could be imposed. All in all, the
court's imposition of punitive damages sent a strong message to
deter individuals from infringing on one's right of publicity in the
future, and thus helped the right of publicity tort measure up to
its unjust enrichment rationale.
69
The court's assessment of damages for emotional injuries fur-
ther helped to shape the right of publicity to fit the modem world.
In short, the court's regard for Waits' emotional injuries amounted
to an acceptance that his image had become part of his personal-
ity, and that his feelings indeed had been hurt from the infringe-
ment. While the aforesaid acceptance is admirable, the court's
165. Id. at 1103 (quoting Young v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App. 3d 108, 114
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983)). Of the $375,000 awarded in compensatory damages, $100,000
was for the fair market value of his services, $200,000 was for injury to his peace,
happiness, and feelings (mental distress); and $75,000 was for injury to his goodwill,
professional standing, and future publicity value. Id.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (a) (West Supp. 1992). The statute defines malice as
"despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others." Id.
167. Id.
168. Weisman, supra note 142, at 731.
169. Rather than being left with mere compensatory damages and feelings of
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position must nevertheless be qualified. The court only allowed
damages for Waits' emotional injuries because it took into consid-
eration Waits' widely known opposition to doing commercials.
This paper, however, proposes that courts go even further in order
to accept the view that it is the extent of that emotional harm
which will vary from case to case, not the fact that the emotional
harm resulted in the first place. 170 When a defendant intrudes
into a person's sphere of autonomous "decision-making" and uses
an image which has become inextricably intertwined with his per-
sonality, is it inevitable that emotional harm will result.17 1 The
fact that an individual has made it publicly known that he is
opposed to doing commercials should thus go to the extent of the
emotional harm suffered.
VII. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity must adapt to life in the late 1990s,
where image, to the athlete or celebrity, is indeed "everything."
Given the vast amount of time and effort the celebrity/athlete
devotes to crafting and maintaining a particular image, it is only
logical to accept the fact that his image becomes part of his per-
sonality. As such, the right of publicity should be viewed as a pro-
prietary right which grants the individual exclusive control over
his identity and recognizes that damage from a right of publicity
infringement will inevitably sink deeper than the harm done to
one's image (i.e., economic harm). The infringement will invaria-
bly cause mental distress and hurt feelings. In that regard, the
right of publicity might be better regarded, as one scholar has sug-
gested, as a "'right of identity'-a right where "elements of both
mental distress and commercial loss [are included] in the mea-
surement of damages."172
If courts recognize that emotional harm occurs by the mere
fact that a celebrity or athlete's "sphere of decision-making" has
been invaded, the attorney would then be left to argue the extent
of those injuries. 73 To that end, the attorney would need to pro-
duce evidence showing that the victim's emotional injury was
worsened because the product, or the advertisement depicting the
product, was offensive or despicable. Moreover, if the victim is
170. See generally Weisman, supra note 142, at 731.
171. Id. at 730.
172. Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and The First
Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HoFSTRA PRop. L.J.
171, 182-183, (1990) (quoting McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 1.11 [C], 1-47).
173. Weisman, supra note 142, at 730.
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someone who, like Waits, had made it well-known that he is
against endorsing commercial products, the attorney could then
argue that his client's firm stance against product endorsements
added to his client's emotional injuries. Likewise, the attorney
could also argue that the manner in which the defendant went
about infringing upon the plaintiffs right of publicity was inten-
tional and malicious, thus warranting the imposition of punitive
damages.
In sum, Waits should serve as a model and a springboard for
future right of publicity cases nationwide. Because of Waits, a
utilitarian calculus can no longer guide the acts of potential
"infringers" in California. Punitive damages will always be wait-
ing in the wings, ready to teach the infringer and others that
stealing from anyone is wrong, including from the celebrity or ath-
lete. When all is said and done, it is clear that only by following
Waits' lead will the right of publicity tort serve to prevent unjust
enrichment, deter bad behavior, and catch up to life in the late
1990s. Only then will the "image is everything" slogan become
reality in the legal arena, for only then will stars like Michael Jor-
dan be able to sit comfortably at home, watch television with his
family, and know that the law is there to protect his image from
being infringed upon and his feelings from being hurt.
174
174. As noted in footnote 3, this paper focuses only on the right of publicity tort
and does not address copyright issues or other intellectual property rights which
should be considered when faced with right of publicity claims. The analysis of the
hypothetical commercial with the Michael Jordan look-alike is therefore premised on
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